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FINALITY, HABEAS, INNOCENCE, AND THE DEATH
PENALTY: CAN JUSTICE BE DONE?
Ellyde Roko*
Abstract: In 1995, Judge Betty Binns Fletcher posed a question: In the context of the
death penalty, can justice be done? She did not answer the question at the time. However, an
examination of the procedural hurdles now facing condemned inmates seeking review of
claims of constitutional violations suggests the answer is no. Too often courts, including the
Supreme Court, have favored finality over fairness, elevating strict adherence to procedural
rules over the responsibility to make sure justice is done. Nowhere is the problem clearer
than in the arena of actual innocence, where the failure to consider a condemned inmate’s
claim on the merits could lead to the execution of an innocent person.
This Article argues that the Supreme Court’s 2009 response to a petition for an original
writ of habeas corpus in In re Davis1 shows that courts have gone too far. Rather than merely
weeding out frivolous claims or showing deference to reasoned state court decisions, federal
courts have allowed arcane procedural rules to prevent even meritorious claims from being
heard. The Supreme Court’s rare intervention should encourage courts to interpret procedural
rules less stringently in an effort to make sure justice is done.
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INTRODUCTION
In the August 2009 case of In re Davis,2 the Supreme Court of the
United States took the unusual step of directing a district court in
Georgia to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the possible innocence of a
death row inmate.3 After seeking relief from the Georgia Supreme
Court4 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit5 without
success, the inmate petitioned the Supreme Court for an original writ of
habeas corpus.6 The Court had not granted such a writ in nearly fifty
years.7 Surprisingly, the Court directed the district court to hold an
evidentiary hearing on the claim.8 As Justice John Paul Stevens wrote in
a concurring opinion, “The substantial risk of putting an innocent man to
death clearly provides an adequate justification for holding an
evidentiary hearing.”9
The procedural rarity of the case, however, quickly fell under the
shadow of Justice Antonin Scalia’s proclamation in a dissent. “This
Court,” Justice Scalia wrote,
has never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a
convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial but is later
able to convince a habeas court that he is “actually” innocent.
Quite the contrary, we have repeatedly left that question
2. 558 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009) (mem.).
3. Id. at 1.
4. Davis v. State, 660 S.E.2d 354 (Ga. 2008).
5. In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810 (11th Cir. 2009).
6. Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1. The Supreme Court outlined its guidelines for granting an original writ
of habeas corpus in Felker v. Turpin in 1996, requiring “exceptional circumstances warranting the
exercise of the Court’s discretionary powers” and a showing that “adequate relief cannot be
obtained in any other form or from any other court.” 518 U.S. 681, 665 (1996) (citing SUP. CT. R.
20.4(a)). The procedures included the guidance that “[t]hese writs are rarely granted.” Id.
7. Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today this Court takes the extraordinary step—
one not taken in nearly 50 years—of instructing a district court to adjudicate a state prisoner’s
petition for an original writ of habeas corpus.”).
8. Id. at 1 (majority opinion).
9. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
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unresolved, while expressing considerable doubt that any claim
based on alleged “actual innocence” is constitutionally
cognizable.10
The Supreme Court’s dramatic action in Davis highlights the failures
of the existing system of appellate and habeas review. Davis, unable to
achieve relief through the usual state and federal channels, had to rely on
an unlikely action of the Supreme Court to avoid a potentially
unconstitutional execution. Given the rarity of such relief, the specter of
executing condemned inmates innocent of death penalty crimes looms.
Indeed, innocent defendants have been sentenced to death11 and
evidence suggests some of them have been executed.12 The Davis case
highlights a question that most often falls on the shoulders of lower
court judges: In the context of the death penalty, can justice be done?
Judge Fletcher posed this question in 1995 while giving the Madison
Lecture at New York University School of Law.13 In her lecture, Judge
Fletcher highlighted the responsibility of federal district and appellate
judges in ensuring justice for defendants sentenced to death: “While
some may view the courts as obstructions when appeals drag on for
years, the federal courts are surely not doing their duty if they fail to
protect the constitutional rights of capital defendants and if they tolerate
execution of innocent people.”14
Judge Fletcher and her fellow judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit shouldered that responsibility under intense public
scrutiny in 1992. That year, the pending execution of Robert Alton
10. Id. at 3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11. See, e.g., STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 303–05 (2002);
Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40
STAN. L. REV. 21, 31 (1987) (conducting a study of “cases in which the defendant was erroneously
convicted of a capital crime and sentenced to death”); Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, On Lawful
Lawlessness: George Ryan, Executive Clemency, and the Rhetoric of Sparing Life, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 1307, 1330–42 (2004) (describing former Illinois governor George Ryan’s actions in
pardoning four condemned inmates and commuting the sentences of the 167 remaining on death
row).
12. See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 11, at 303–05; David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute
an Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, at 54–55 (noting that “[t]he fear that an innocent
person might be executed has long haunted jurors and lawyers and judges” and that “[i]n recent
years . . . questions have mounted over whether the system is fail-safe”).
13. See Betty B. Fletcher, The Death Penalty in America: Can Justice Be Done?, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 811 (1995) (text of the speech). The James Madison Lecture Series started in 1960 and is
“designed to enhance the appreciation of civil liberty and strengthen the sense of national purpose.”
NYU Law James Madison Lectures, http://www.law.nyu.edu/academics/fellowships/haysprogram/
LitigationandLectures/JamesMadisonLectures/index.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2009). Justice Hugo
L. Black gave the first Madison Lecture. Id.
14. Fletcher, supra note 13, at 818.
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Harris in California placed Judge Fletcher and her colleagues on the
Ninth Circuit squarely in the middle of the death penalty controversy.15
As described in newspaper accounts, “[f]or more than six hours, behindthe-scenes maneuvering by the group of defiant liberal judges delayed
Harris’s execution as they sought to give every conceivable issue in his
case a fair hearing.”16 The decision of whether Harris would face
execution that night pitted “a faction of liberal judges scattered across
the Western states”17 against the Supreme Court on two different issues.
First, the Ninth Circuit’s order in the Harris case addressed whether
Harris received a sufficient hearing on new evidence that his brother had
shot one of the victims Harris was convicted of murdering.18 Second,
three inmates facing execution, including Harris, had filed a lawsuit in
federal court alleging that lethal gas, California’s method of execution,
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.19 A panel of Ninth Circuit
judges elected to stay Harris’s execution for ten days, “a move
spearheaded by liberal Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher of Seattle.”20
Unlike in Davis’s case, the Supreme Court did not grant Harris relief.
Rather, the Supreme Court made the unusual move of issuing an order in
the wee hours of the morning that “[n]o further stays of Robert Alton
Harris’ execution shall be entered by the federal courts except upon
order of this Court.”21 Within thirty-six minutes, Mr. Harris was dead.22
He was executed before any court could hear his claims.
15. See Richard C. Paddock & Henry Weinstein, Harris Execution Led Nation’s Top Judges to
Hours of Conflict—Supreme Court Takes a Tough Stand at Top, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 22, 1992, at
A1. For in-depth analyses of the Harris case, see Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and
Hierarchy: Reflections on the Harris Execution, 102 YALE L.J. 255 (1992); Evan Caminker &
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Lawless Execution of Robert Alton Harris, 102 YALE L.J. 225 (1992);
Stephen Reinhardt, The Supreme Court, the Death Penalty, and the Harris Case, 102 YALE L.J. 205
(1992).
16. Paddock & Weinstein, supra note 15, at A1; see generally Reinhardt, supra note 15.
17. Paddock & Weinstein, supra note 15, at A1.
18. See Reinhardt, supra note 15, at 209–10; see also Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1503–04
(9th Cir. 1990) (discussing the involvement of both Harris and his brother); Paddock & Weinstein,
supra note 15, at A1.
19. See Fierro v. Gomez, 790 F. Supp. 966 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (alleging cruel and unusual
punishment after a horrifying scene at a Arizona lethal gas execution); see also Reinhardt, supra
note 15, at 207, 218–19. The Ninth Circuit eventually found execution by lethal gas
unconstitutional. Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301, 309 (9th Cir. 1996).
20. Paddock & Weinstein, supra note 15, at A3. Numerous judges played a large part in the
behind-the-scenes maneuvering. See generally Reinhardt, supra note 15 (describing the events
surrounding the Harris case).
21. Vasquez v. Harris, 503 U.S. 1000, 1000 (1992) (mem.); see also Reinhardt, supra note 15, at
213 (describing the stays issued in the Harris case).
22. See Paddock & Weinstein, supra note 15, at A3.
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The move “spearheaded”23 by Judge Fletcher reflects her philosophy
on the role of federal judges in death penalty cases. As Judge Fletcher
noted in her Madison Lecture, condemned inmates trying to enforce
their rights and judges trying to protect those rights face incredible
hurdles.24 Judges must vigorously guard the rights of the defendants
accused and convicted of the most brutal crimes while navigating an
increasingly restrictive procedural framework.25 The procedural
mechanisms surrounding death penalty appeals and habeas petitions
have created such obstacles to justice that the Supreme Court in Davis
reverted to ordering a hearing on an original writ even though the Court
had not granted such a writ in nearly fifty years. The Davis decision
demonstrates that the answer to Judge Fletcher’s question, “can justice
be done?” might in fact be “no.” Absent the unlikely event of Supreme
Court intervention, no court would have held an evidentiary hearing on
Davis’s actual innocence claim. In general, judges must take
extraordinary measures to justify review on the merits, and painstakingly
examine the claims of the defendants that society has deemed the “worst
of the worst” to guarantee their convictions and death sentences are fair.
The Davis case, however, has the potential to turn the focus back to the
merits of such claims, particularly in the area of actual innocence.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I briefly examines the
increasingly restrictive scope of habeas review, focusing on the
procedural hurdles courts and inmates must overcome to reach
adjudication on the merits. Part II analyzes the case of Thompson v.
Calderon,26 in which Judge Fletcher and her fellow Ninth Circuit judges
made remarkable efforts to ensure that procedural barriers did not result
in the execution of a possibly innocent man. Finally, Part III reviews the
Supreme Court’s action in Davis and its possible implications, and
concludes that the law that has developed around habeas corpus review
has made justice difficult to achieve, but that the Supreme Court’s
decision could encourage lower federal courts to reach the merits of
actual innocence claims.

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Fletcher, supra note 13, at 818–20.
Id. at 821.
120 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1997), rev’d, 523 U.S. 538 (1998).
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PROCEDURAL RESTRICTIONS INCREASINGLY HAVE
PREVENTED COURTS FROM REVIEWING HABEAS
PETITIONS ON THE MERITS

As Judge Fletcher explained in her 1995 Madison Lecture, in the
context of the death penalty, “we have prolonged review processes that
more often than not deflect attention from the real issues of fair trial and
possible innocence to arcane examinations of technical bars.”27 Judges
must navigate a confusing rubric of death penalty procedure, a maze that
increasingly has narrowed defendants’ abilities to challenge potential
constitutional violations.28 Generally, post-conviction review happens
through habeas corpus, the availability of which has been restricted over
the past few decades.29 Numerous scholars and judges have criticized the
injustice that results from procedural constraints.30 These procedural
cards, which are stacked against the condemned inmate, have made
“performing habeas review within these restrictions . . . an awesome
task.”31
One need not look far for evidence of these hurdles. In 1996, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) established
strict guidelines for habeas review.32 AEDPA permits a federal court to
grant a writ of habeas corpus only if a state court decision is “contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
27. Fletcher, supra note 13, at 826.
28. See LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 497 (2d ed. 2003) (placing the success rate for
habeas petitions at about four percent and attributing that figure to “prisoners’ inability to marshal
their claims and thread their way through the maze of procedural obstacles that lie in their path on
the way to an adjudication on the merits”).
29. See infra notes 32–42 and accompanying text; see also Todd E. Pettys, Killing Roger
Coleman: Habeas, Finality, and the Innocence Gap, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2313, 2355 (2007).
Many in Congress have apparently concluded that, even when a prisoner can prove that he or
she is probably innocent, Americans are content to have the federal courts ignore the prisoner’s
constitutional claims and allow the prisoner to be punished—even executed—if the prisoner’s
attorneys did not obey all of the applicable procedural rules and if the prisoner’s exculpatory
evidence is not quite clear and convincing.
Id.
30. See, e.g., John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259
(2006) (examining AEDPA and arguing that the Supreme Court “significantly curtailed the writ of
habeas corpus” in the years preceding AEDPA); Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme
Court’s Habeas Reform, 83 CAL. L. REV. 485 (1995) (concluding that the Supreme Court's efforts at
habeas reform had failed); Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82
TUL. L. REV. 443 (2007) (arguing that AEDPA should not be read as disfavoring habeas relief);
Pettys, supra note 29.
31. Fletcher, supra note 13, at 821.
32. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253–2255, 2261–2266 (2000)).
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Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”
or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.”33 AEDPA also imposes a one-year statute of
limitations on habeas petitions34 and further limits prisoners’ ability to
file more than one such petition.35
Even before the passage of AEDPA, however, the Supreme Court for
decades had been restricting habeas corpus relief.36 The Warren Court
had allowed for the expansion of habeas corpus, making it “the federal
machinery for bringing new constitutional values to bear in concrete
cases.”37 But the Rehnquist Court had a different approach, “sometimes
squarely overrul[ing] Warren Court precedents and sometimes forg[ing]
its own novel doctrines to circumscribe the writ.”38 Over the years, the
Rehnquist Court invoked the concept of “finality” with increasing
frequency to justify procedures prohibiting review.39 As a result,
“[f]inality, federalism, and to a lesser extent the preservation of judicial
resources, all have come to top fairness as the mainstay of habeas.”40 By
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
34. Id.; see also Kovarsky, supra note 30, at 453.
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
36. See YACKLE, supra note 28, at 495–96; see also In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 831 (11th Cir.
2009) (“There is no question that, even pre-AEDPA, the procedural obstacles to filing a second or
successive habeas petition were considerable.” (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 317–19
(1995))); see generally Mark V. Tushnet & Larry W. Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The
Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1 (1997) (arguing that many of the key provisions of AEDPA merely codified
changes the Supreme Court already had made).
37. YACKLE, supra note 28, at 494 (describing how habeas corpus under the Warren Court
provided review by “independent Article III courts willing and able to check the coercive power of
government”).
38. Id. at 495. See also Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of an Execution: Fairness vs.
“Process,” 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 313, 314 (1999) (“The Rehnquist Court will be remembered for its
stark reversal of the Warren-Brennan Court’s expansion of individual rights and protections and for
elevating procedural rules over substantive values and limiting rights generally, especially those of
racial minorities.”). These changes also can be attributed to the Court’s adoption of theories
advanced by two prominent scholars regarding the need for a narrower scope of habeas corpus
review. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 451–52 (1963) (“The procedural arrangements we create for the
adjudication of criminal guilt have an important bearing on the effectiveness of the substantive
commands of the criminal law. I suggest that finality may be a crucial element of this effectiveness.
Surely it is essential to the educational and deterrent functions of the criminal law that we be able to
say that one violating that law will swiftly and certainly become subject to punishment, just
punishment.”); Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970).
39. Pettys, supra note 29, at 2335–39.
40. Friedman, supra note 30, at 491.
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the time Congress passed AEDPA in 1996, “a Supreme Court impatient
for congressional action had already done much of the work itself in a
series of opinions overruling precedent in order to make it harder for
condemned prisoners to have their constitutional claims heard by a
federal court.”41 In that same year, the Rehnquist Court determined that
AEDPA did not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to
entertain original habeas corpus petitions, but that AEDPA did impose
new conditions on the Court’s ability to grant relief.42
As a result, today lower court federal judges spend the majority of
their time in habeas cases trying to determine whether the court can hear
the inmate’s claim.43 This onerous task has earned the disdain of
numerous judges. For example, in Coleman v. Thompson44 in 1991, the
Supreme Court denied relief on procedural grounds to a death row
inmate whose lawyers had filed a state appeal one day late.45 This
holding prompted a dissent by Justice Harry Blackmun, joined by
Justices Thurgood Marshall and John Paul Stevens. The Justices rebuked
the Court for continuing its “crusade to erect petty procedural barriers in
the path of any state prisoner seeking review of his federal constitutional
claims” and “creating a Byzantine morass of arbitrary, unnecessary, and
unjustifiable impediments to the vindication of federal rights.”46 Before
the Davis case reached the Supreme Court, a dissent from an Eleventh
Circuit judge hearing the case emphasized these procedural obstacles,
writing that the case “highlights the difficulties in navigating AEDPA’s
thicket of procedural brambles.”47 And AEDPA’s limitations led Judge
Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit to describe the legislation as “a
mockery of the careful boundaries between Congress and the courts that
our Constitution’s Framers believed so essential to the prevention of
tyranny.”48

41. BANNER, supra note 11, at 293.
42. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 658 (1996).
43. See, e.g., Reinhardt, supra note 38, at 318–19 (estimating that judges “spend up to ninety
percent of [their] time in capital cases and other habeas proceedings trying to determine whether a
defendant’s rights have unwittingly been forfeited and trying to apply the Supreme Court’s arcane
and almost impenetrable procedural rules”).
44. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
45. See id. at 757.
46. Id. at 758–59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
47. In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 827 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
48. Crater v. Galaza, 508 F.3d 1261, 1270 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc). In his dissent, Judge Reinhardt wrote he would hold section 104 of
AEDPA unconstitutional and a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Judge Reinhardt
reasoned that section 2254(d)(1) intrudes on the judicial power that Article III vests in the courts
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It is in this environment that judges must seek justice.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT ELEVATED PROCEDURE OVER
JUSTICE IN THOMPSON V. CALDERON

On a daily basis, federal court judges must balance proper procedure
with substantive fairness. The story of Thomas Martin Thompson, a
California inmate sentenced to death, “illustrates sharply the values,
interests, and concerns weighed in death penalty habeas cases . . . . On
the one hand, federal courts consider the state’s interest in finality and
comity; on the other hand, they consider the interest of the defendant and
the public in preserving constitutional values.”49 In Thompson’s case, a
majority of the Ninth Circuit judges sitting en banc vacated his death
sentence because of constitutional violations at trial.50 Then, the
Supreme Court reversed—on procedural grounds—and California
executed Thompson.51
A.

The Ninth Circuit Acted to Prevent a Miscarriage of Justice

Two days before Thompson’s scheduled execution in August 1997,
the Ninth Circuit went to extraordinary lengths to vacate his death
sentence.52 Earlier in the year, the district court had granted Thompson’s
habeas corpus petition in part, finding that Thompson’s trial counsel had
been constitutionally deficient.53 But a panel of the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court, holding that counsel’s performance had not
resulted in prejudice.54 A judge requested that the entire circuit receive
notification of a refusal to amend the opinion or rehear the case,
generally viewed as a precursor to a call for en banc review.55 But no
judge called for an en banc review and the deadline for doing so

“by prohibiting the federal courts from applying the ordinary principles of stare decisis in deciding
habeas cases involving prisoners held in state custody” and “by requiring federal courts to give
effect to incorrect state rulings that, in the federal courts’ independent judgment” violate the
Constitution. Id. at 1261–62.
49. Reinhardt, supra note 38, at 346.
50. Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 1997), rev’d, 523 U.S. 538 (1998).
51. Cal. Dep’t. Corr. and Rehab., Capital Punishment, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/
thomasThompson.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
52. See Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1048–51 (describing the process).
53. Id. at 1047.
54. Id. The panel’s amended decision is reported in Thompson v. Calderon, 109 F.3d 1358
(1997).
55. See Reinhardt, supra note 38, at 328–29.
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passed.56 The Supreme Court declined to review the case and Thompson
asked the original panel to reconsider its decision.57 When the panel
refused to do so and all other proceedings had been exhausted without
granting Thompson relief,58 a majority of active judges on the Ninth
Circuit recalled the mandate—the original panel decision from which no
judge had called for en banc review—“convinced that the panel
committed fundamental errors of law that would result in manifest
injustice.”59 The Ninth Circuit vacated the death sentence in its en banc
decision.60
1.

Substantive Considerations: Thompson’s Claims for Relief

Thompson challenged the constitutionality of his conviction on two
grounds: ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial
misconduct.61 Thompson alleged that his counsel’s performance at trial
was deficient because his attorney did not rebut forensic evidence of
rape and did not adequately impeach two government informants.62
Thompson also claimed that the prosecutor’s use of inconsistent case
theories in the separate trials of Thompson and his co-defendant, David
Leitch, constituted prosecutorial misconduct that violated due process.63
The court, in an opinion Judge Fletcher authored, examined the
performance of Thompson’s counsel at trial under the standard the
Supreme Court articulated in Strickland v. Washington.64 The Ninth
Circuit pointed to counsel’s failure to rebut forensic evidence
demonstrating that Thompson committed the rape, which provided the
grounds for a death sentence.65 The coroner had found a lack of physical
evidence indicating rape occurred; an expert called during the
evidentiary hearing testified in part that bruises on the victim were
several weeks old and that the bodily fluids found on the victim were
56. See Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1047; see also Reinhardt, supra note 38, at 330–32.
57. See Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1047–48; see also Reinhardt, supra note 38, at 334–36.
58. See Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1048; see also Reinhardt, supra note 38, at 335–36.
59. Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1048.
60. Id. at 1048, 1060.
61. Id. at 1051–59.
62. Id. at 1052–55.
63. Id. at 1055–59.
64. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland established a two-step process for showing ineffective
assistance of counsel: First, counsel’s performance was deficient, and second, “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” Id. at 694.
65. See Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1052–53.
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more consistent with consensual intercourse.66 Thompson’s counsel did
not pursue this avenue in part because it did not fit with his theory that
another perpetrator had committed the rape, which conflicted with the
coroner’s testimony that there was no physical evidence of rape.67 The
commission of a rape in conjunction with murder provided not only the
alleged motive for Thompson to commit the murder, but also the special
circumstances making Thompson eligible for the death penalty.68
Therefore, counsel’s strategic error prejudiced Thompson by subjecting
him to the death penalty: “We can think of no error more prejudicial
than one that is the precipitating cause of an erroneous death sentence.”69
The court then examined trial counsel’s failure to impeach two
jailhouse informants.70 The evidentiary hearing had revealed that law
enforcement officers found Edward Fink, who testified against
Thompson at trial, to be an unreliable informant.71 Fink had a long
history of fabricating confessions so he could reap the benefits
associated with providing the information.72 During trial, Thompson’s
counsel cross-examined Fink about prior felony convictions, his lengthy
history of crime, and his abuse of drugs, but “stopped investigating
Fink’s background before trial because he believed he had enough
material to cross-examine Fink, and . . . stopped cross-examining him
because he thought the judge was getting restless and the jury had
‘gotten the message.’”73
Thompson’s counsel also failed to impeach a second informant with
readily available evidence, including the incorrect details of the alleged
confession, which “parroted almost verbatim inaccurate news reports.”74
Thompson’s counsel did not introduce evidence that the second
informant
had served as an informant since the age of fourteen, that two
police agencies . . . considered him unreliable, that [his] family
considered him to be a pathological liar, and that [he] had shared

66. Id. at 1052.
67. Id. at 1052–53. The panel had found that counsel’s strategic decision in this regard fell below
the level of reasonableness, but did not result in prejudice. Id. at 1050, 1053.
68. See id. at 1053.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1053–54.
71. Id. at 1054. Another lawyer had successfully used information about Fink’s unreliability to
get the case against his client dropped when Fink was a witness. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1053–54.
74. Id. at 1054.
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a cell with Leitch [Thompson’s co-defendant] for several weeks
before coming into contact with Thompson.75
The inadequate impeachment of the informants prejudiced Thompson,
the en banc court found, in part because the prosecution relied so heavily
on the informants’ testimony as the dispositive evidence that Thompson
had committed the rape and murder.76 Effective impeachment would
have weakened the prosecution’s case substantially.77 Therefore, the
cumulative effect of counsel’s errors “cast grave doubt on the reliability
of the rape conviction and the rape special circumstance finding, and
thus of the death sentence itself.”78
The court also addressed Thompson’s claims of prosecutorial
misconduct, finding that a prosecutor cannot present inconsistent
evidence and theories of the same crime to convict two different
defendants at separate trials.79 In the preliminary phase of the trial, when
Thompson and Leitch were being tried jointly, the prosecution presented
the testimony of jailhouse informants who testified that Thompson had
told them Leitch wanted the victim dead and that Thompson had had
consensual sex with the victim before her murder.80 But the prosecution
did not call these informants at Thompson’s trial, instead relying on two
new informants who testified that Thompson said he had raped the
victim.81 At Leitch’s trial, the prosecutor called the original informants,
who had testified as defense witnesses in Thompson’s trial—and to
whose testimony the prosecution had objected.82 After securing a guilty
verdict in Thompson’s trial, the prosecutor “manipulated evidence and
witnesses, argued inconsistent motives, and at Leitch’s trial essentially
ridiculed the theory he had used to obtain a conviction and death
sentence at Thompson’s trial.”83
While the prosecutorial misconduct claim did not receive a majority
of votes in the en banc court, Judge Fletcher, joined by three other
judges, found that the prosecutor’s actions rose to the level of
prosecutorial misconduct.84 Such conduct prejudiced Thompson because
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id. at 1055.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1058.
Id. at 1055.
Id. at 1056.
Id.
Id. at 1057.
Id. at 1058 (“[I]t is well established that when no new significant evidence comes to light a
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the prosecutor maintained in all proceedings, except Thompson’s trial,
that only Leitch had a motive for murder.85
2.

Procedural Considerations: AEDPA Requires Recall of the
Mandate

Before examining the substance of Thompson’s claims, the en banc
court first had to demonstrate its ability to review the case. AEDPA
requirements made the failure to call for en banc review crucial, and
recall of the mandate necessary, as this habeas petition was Thompson’s
one bite at the apple.86 Although Thompson made additional motions
and introduced additional evidence after failing to receive rehearing
from an en banc court, the majority opinion emphasized that it did not
consider any of that information in reaching its decision.87 It considered
only Thompson’s first petition and the evidence contained within it.88 To
do otherwise would have forced the court to consider Thompson’s claim
under AEDPA’s even more restrictive framework for reviewing
successive petitions.89
The en banc court also emphasized that it did not take lightly the
recall of a mandate in a death penalty case.90 But the circumstances in
the Thompson case were extraordinary. Judge Fletcher’s opinion echoed
the theme from her Madison Lecture a few years earlier that procedural
restraints should not trump justice:
Our interest both in protecting the integrity of our processes and
in preventing injustice are implicated in this case before
us . . . . [I]n reversing the district court, the panel appears to
have made fundamental errors of law that, if not corrected,
would lead to a miscarriage of justice. The consequence of our
failure to act would be the execution of a person as to whom a
prosecutor cannot, in order to convict two defendants at separate trials, offer inconsistent theories
and facts regarding the same crime.”).
85. Id. at 1055, 1059.
86. Congressional history reveals that many thought of AEDPA as giving habeas petitioners “one
bite at the apple.” See, e.g., In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 817–18 (11th Cir. 2009).
87. Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1049.
88. Id.
89. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 553–54 (1998).
90. Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1048 (“Recalling a mandate is an extraordinary remedy and we will
exercise our authority to do so only in exceptional circumstances, such as when it is necessary in
order to prevent injustice.”).
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grave question exists whether he is innocent of the deathqualifying offense, the alleged rape, and whose conviction on
the first-degree murder charge may be fundamentally flawed.
This is a person who has never before been convicted of a crime.
Under these circumstances, we have an obligation to recall the
mandate in order to preserve the integrity of the judicial
process.91
The Ninth Circuit did all it could to follow proper procedure,
carefully justifying reaching the merits of the case.92 But the need to
correct potential constitutional violations resulting in a death sentence
proved no match for the Supreme Court’s laser-like focus on procedure.
B.

The Supreme Court Reversed the En Banc Court on Procedural
Grounds Without Considering the Merits

Thompson’s Ninth Circuit reprieve did not last. With a five-to-four
majority, the Supreme Court reversed the en banc decision,93 with a
majority opinion that ironically highlighted many of the very same
concerns that Judge Fletcher had articulated in her Madison Lecture.
The Supreme Court examined whether the Ninth Circuit had violated
AEDPA or abused its discretion in recalling the mandate sua sponte.94
The Court found no violation of AEDPA because the Ninth Circuit had
addressed the claims and evidence contained only in Thompson’s first
habeas petition.95 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit had tried in earnest to follow
proper procedure.96 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the Ninth
Circuit had abused its discretion.97
In explaining how the Ninth Circuit’s recall of the mandate
constituted an abuse of discretion, the majority invoked the doctrine of
finality.98 The Supreme Court’s opinion highlighted the “profound
societal costs that attend the exercise of habeas jurisdiction,” which
warrant strict limitations on its use.99 “These limits reflect our enduring
respect for the State’s interest in the finality of convictions that have

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 1048–51.
Calderon, 523 U.S. at 541.
Id. at 541–42.
Id. at 554.
Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1048–51.
Calderon, 523 U.S. at 542.
Id. at 555–59.
Id. at 554–55 (quoting Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 539 (1986)).
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survived direct review within the state court system.”100 The Supreme
Court even quoted academic writings from the Warren Court era that
urged a narrowing of habeas review.101 The Court opined that finality
not only enhances the quality of work done by federal judges, but also
preserves the balance between state and federal power.102 As such, when
a federal court of appeals denies habeas relief, “the State is entitled to
the assurance of finality.”103 At that point, “finality acquires an added
moral dimension” and “the State’s interests in actual finality outweigh
the prisoner’s interest in obtaining yet another opportunity for
review.”104
The Court then analyzed the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision.105
Under habeas corpus jurisprudence, the recall of the mandate would be
an abuse of discretion unless necessary to avoid a miscarriage of
justice.106 In the context of innocence, “the miscarriage of justice
exception is concerned with actual as compared to legal innocence.”107
In other words, it is not enough that a habeas petitioner show
constitutional deficiencies at trial; the petitioner must show facts
demonstrating actual innocence. To meet this standard, the petitioner
must demonstrate that new evidence renders it more likely than not that
no reasonable juror would have convicted the petitioner of the
underlying crime.108 To challenge a death sentence, the petitioner must
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror
would have found him eligible for the death penalty.109 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit abused its discretion in
recalling the mandate under either standard.110
A dissent authored by Justice David Souter, and joined by Justices
John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsberg, and Stephen Breyer,111 found

100. Id. at 555 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635
(1993)).
101. Id.
102. Id. (“Finality is essential to both the retributive and the deterrent functions of criminal
law.”).
103. Id. at 556.
104. Id. at 556–57.
105. Id. at 558.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 559 (quoting Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 559–60.
110. Id. at 566.
111. Id. at 566 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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the procedural circumstances surrounding the recall of the mandate
regrettable, but would not have found that the court abused its discretion
in recalling the mandate:
[H]owever true it is that the en banc rehearing process cannot
effectively function to review every three-judge panel that
arguably goes astray in a particular case, surely it is nonetheless
reasonable to resort to en banc correction that may be necessary
to avoid a constitutional error standing between a life sentence
and an execution.112
C.

The Supreme Court’s Decision Led to an Unjust Result

Judge Reinhardt reflected on the unprecedented sequence of events in
Thompson v. Calderon in his own Madison Lecture.113 “Reversal by a
higher court,” he noted, “is not proof that justice is thereby better
done.”114 The Supreme Court’s decision exemplified the Rehnquist
Court’s theory of habeas review: Procedural rules limit a court’s ability
to review the merits of constitutional claims to protect the state’s interest
in finality.115 But “[i]n Thompson, the Court took one further step—its
most indefensible thus far—to elevate state procedural interests over
concern for human life, over due process of law, and yes, over the
Constitution itself.”116
Looking at the Supreme Court’s opinion, it is hard to see the balance
between justice and finality. Whereas the Supreme Court gave “finality”
a moral dimension, it did not do the same for “justice.” The Supreme
Court did not consider whether Thompson’s constitutional rights had
been violated, but rather used the occasion as an opportunity to create a
new rule further restricting the avenues by which condemned inmates
can obtain relief for constitutional violations: A federal appeals court
cannot recall its mandate in a death penalty case unless the defendant
can establish actual innocence.117 The result of the case, despite the best
of efforts of the Ninth Circuit judges to ensure justice, was that “the
worship of abstract procedural principles” resulted in the loss of “our
concern for fairness and justice.”118 The Supreme Court elevated process
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 569.
Reinhardt, supra note 38.
Id. at 314 (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
Id. at 315–16.
Id. at 351–52.
Calderon, 523 U.S. at 558.
Reinhardt, supra note 38, at 319.
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above all else, further limiting the ability of judges to ensure a just
outcome.
After the Supreme Court vacated the decision, the en banc Ninth
Circuit considered Thompson’s motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b),119 in effect, a successive habeas petition.120 The court
thus analyzed Thompson’s claim under the standard set forth in
AEDPA.121 To bring a successive habeas petition, the petitioner must
show that
the factual predicate for the claim could not have been
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence [and
that] the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in
light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional
error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant
guilty of the underlying offense.122
The court found that Thompson failed to meet the second prong.123
The additional evidence Thompson offered, viewed in light of the
evidence as a whole, would not “be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable
factfinder would have found Thompson guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of rape, which was the sole aggravating factor supporting the
death penalty.”124

119. Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1998). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b) provides for relief from a final order based upon newly discovered evidence:
[O]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; . . . or (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
120. In habeas cases governed by AEDPA, courts treat Rule 60(b) motions as successive petitions
under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). Thompson, 151 F.3d at 920–21.
121. Thompson, 151 F.3d at 921–22. As discussed, the procedural rules governing habeas review
made the recall of the mandate necessary to prevent the court from considering the petition under
the more restrictive guidelines for successive habeas petitions. See supra notes 80–83 and
accompanying text. The Supreme Court explicitly stated that, had the court considered claims or
evidence presented in Thompson’s later filings, its action would have been based on a successive
application, and so would be subject to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), one of AEDPA’s limiting provisions.
Calderon, 523 U.S. at 554.
122. Thompson, 151 F.3d at 924 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) (2000)).
123. Id. at 926.
124. Id. at 925.
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Judge Reinhardt dissented.125 Although he agreed with most of the
majority’s opinion, he would have found Thompson made the requisite
prima facie showing.126 In analyzing Thompson’s claim, Judge
Reinhardt referenced the prior en banc decision, in which the court held
that constitutional violations permeated the trial, noting that the
substance of that decision still stood because the Supreme Court had
reversed on procedural grounds.127 In such circumstances, the
constitutional violations “must color the prism” through which the court
considered Thompson’s successive petition.128 Despite AEDPA’s
significant obstacles, Judge Reinhardt emphasized, a prisoner who
makes a convincing demonstration of actual innocence can, in fact, have
his claim heard on the merits.129 Judge Reinhardt warned that “the
miscarriage of justice that is about to occur is the product of the federal
judiciary’s elevation of procedure over justice, of speed and efficiency
over fairness and due process.”130
III. DAVIS COULD ALLOW COURTS TO FOCUS ON THE
MERITS IN CERTAIN FACTUAL SITUATIONS
As Justice Scalia pointed out in Davis, the Supreme Court “has never
held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant
who has had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas
court that he is ‘actually’ innocent.”131 But the Supreme Court’s action
in Davis indicates that the Supreme Court will not tolerate the execution
of a condemned inmate in the face of convincing evidence tending to
show actual innocence. After years of procedure trumping justice, the
Supreme Court may have signaled in Davis that constitutional values
cannot always come second, at least when it comes to actual innocence.

125. Id. at 931 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. (“This court’s refusal to allow Thompson to file a habeas petition will result in the
execution of a man who was convicted and sentenced to death in a trial that violated fundamental
principles of fairness, in which the constitutional violations were so egregious that seven former
prosecutors, themselves highly experienced in death penalty cases, took the remarkable step of
filing an amicus brief on his behalf with the United States Supreme Court.”).
129. Id. at 937 (“Despite increasing restrictions on the writ of habeas corpus, the door has
nonetheless been left open for someone who can make a convincing demonstration of actual
innocence under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B).”).
130. Id.
131. 558 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2009) (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The Eleventh Circuit in Davis Applied AEDPA in a Potentially
Unconstitutional Way

Before the Davis case arrived at the Supreme Court, the Eleventh
Circuit had addressed Davis’s actual innocence claim.132 The evidence
supporting Davis’s claim of innocence included “seven of nine key trial
witnesses recant[ing] their testimony.”133 The two remaining witnesses
were the alternative suspect and a witness who, despite telling police he
could not identify the shooter, later identified Davis.134 Three witnesses
declared in sworn affidavits that the alternative suspect—the one who
ran to tell police of the murder in the first place—had confessed to the
murder.135
But the majority declined to grant Davis relief on his innocence claim
because the evidence tending to show Davis’s innocence could not be
introduced at that point under AEDPA.136 AEDPA allows a successive
habeas petition only if the evidence could not have been discovered
earlier;137 Davis had introduced much of the relevant evidence in support
of his earlier ineffective assistance of counsel claim.138 While Davis
argued that he could not have brought his actual innocence claim earlier
because he had not yet exhausted his state remedies on that claim, the
majority held that Davis should have brought the actual innocence claim
in his first petition and the court would have stayed the petition while he
exhausted the claim.139 Therefore, the majority considered only the new
evidence that could not previously have been discovered—one
affidavit.140 That affidavit, “standing alone,” could not overcome the
state’s evidence at trial to make a “clear and convincing” showing of
actual innocence.141
The majority’s opinion in the Eleventh Circuit decision in Davis again
highlights the ways in which restrictions on habeas corpus have eclipsed
132. 565 F.3d 810 (11th Cir. 2009).
133. Id. at 827 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 822 (majority opinion).
137. Id. at 819 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) (2000)).
138. Id. at 819–20.
139. Id. at 820. The court then stated Davis had not adequately explained why he failed to bring
his actual innocence claim in state court at an earlier point. Id. at 821. The court also noted that
Davis could have brought his actual innocence claim in his first petition and tried to overcome its
procedural default. Id.
140. Id. at 822.
141. Id. at 824.
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justice. Despite evidence indicating that Davis might be innocent, the
Eleventh Circuit held that AEDPA prevented it from looking at that
evidence.142 Furthermore, the majority found that, under AEDPA, Davis
had to show a separate constitutional violation in addition to showing
clear and convincing evidence of actual innocence.143 Judge Barkett, in
dissent, reasoned that AEDPA could not apply “when to do so would
offend the Constitution and the fundamental concept of justice that an
innocent man should not be executed.”144 On such occasions, judges
must assure a just outcome despite procedural obstacles.145 Admitting
that judges “must deal with the thorny constitutional and statutory
questions,” the dissent urged that courts not “lose sight of the underlying
issue.”146 “To execute Davis, in the face of a significant amount of
proffered evidence that may establish his actual innocence, is
unconscionable and unconstitutional.”147
In denying relief, the majority explicitly noted that Davis still could
petition the Supreme Court for an original writ of habeas corpus.148 In
doing so, the majority may have signaled the legitimacy of Davis’s
claim, implicitly acknowledging that Davis’s case had the “exceptional
circumstances warranting the exercise of the Court’s discretionary
powers” when “adequate relief cannot be obtained in any other form or
from any other court.”149 Considering that the Supreme Court had not
granted such a writ in fifty years, the chances of Davis achieving relief
were slim. Nonetheless, the court recommended that Davis use the writ
and stayed his execution for an extra thirty days so he could do so.150
The unlikely ground for relief the Eleventh Circuit posited actually
garnered results.151 Justice Stevens’s concurrence in In re Davis,

142. Id.
143. Id. (“The statute undeniably requires a petitioner seeking leave to file a second or successive
petition to establish actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence and another constitutional
violation.”).
144. Id. at 827 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“In this case, the circumstances do not fit neatly into the
narrow procedural confines delimited by AEDPA.”).
145. Id. at 827–28 (noting that “it is precisely this type of occasion that warrants judicial
intervention”).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 826 (majority opinion). “The Supreme Court has made clear that the habeas corpus
statute, even after the AEDPA amendments of 1996, continues to allow it to grant a writ of habeas
corpus filed pursuant to its original jurisdiction.” Id. at 826–27.
149. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 665 (1996).
150. Davis, 565 F.3d at 826–27.
151. See In re Davis, 558 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009) (mem.).
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supporting the decision to order the district court to hold an evidentiary
hearing, echoed Judge Barkett’s dissent, which argued that an “actual
innocence” claim should receive separate treatment under AEDPA.152 If
courts interpret AEDPA as barring the claim of a death row inmate who
can establish his innocence, then the section of AEDPA barring such a
claim would be unconstitutional.153 “Alternatively, the court may find in
such a case that the statute’s text is satisfied, because decisions of this
Court clearly support the proposition that it ‘would be an atrocious
violation of our Constitution and the principles upon which it is based’
to execute an innocent person.”154
B.

Davis Could Shift the Focus from Process Back to Substance

Over the years, dozens of condemned inmates have been released
from prison because they were found to be innocent.155 DNA evidence
exculpated some of them,156 but most had “been victims of dishonest
witnesses, prosecutors, or police officers, whose lies were found out
only years later.”157 Yet when courts find that procedural hurdles prevent
adjudication on the merits, the resulting opinions tend to downplay the
evidence demonstrating innocence “to persuade the public that justice
has been done.”158 The Eleventh Circuit panel in Davis and the en banc
Ninth Circuit addressing Thompson’s successive petition both appeared
to do just this.159 However, as Judge Fletcher noted:
We cannot allow ourselves to be lulled by the belief that the
crimes for which the death penalty is imposed are uniformly
heinous and that the chance of actual innocence in any given
case is virtually nonexistent. Unfortunately, that belief is false.

152. Id. at 1–2 (Stevens, J., concurring); Davis, 565 F.3d at 827–31 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
153. Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1 (“Even if the court finds that § 2254(d)(1) applies in full, it is arguably
unconstitutional to the extent it bars relief for a death row inmate who has established his
innocence.”).
154. Id. at 1–2 (quoting Davis, 565 F.3d at 830). Yet Justice Scalia in his dissent reasoned that
“[t]here is no sound basis for distinguishing an actual-innocence claim from any other claim that is
alleged to have produced a wrongful conviction.” Id. at 3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. BANNER, supra note 11, at 303.
156. Id. at 303–04.
157. Id. at 304.
158. Pettys, supra note 29, at 2360.
159. “All one need do is read Judge Fletcher’s en banc opinion of last August to discover that
today’s characterization of the evidence is plainly incorrect.” Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918,
933–34 (9th Cir. 1998) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).

Roko DTPed2.doc (Do Not Delete)

128

2/11/2010 4:35 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:107

The danger of executing innocent people is real, and any cleareyed assessment of the death penalty must recognize this.160
Importantly, the Supreme Court’s action in Davis makes apparent the
viability of actual innocence claims in death penalty cases. Less apparent
is what will happen in the wake of Davis. As it stands today, the
exacting standard for demonstrating the level of actual innocence
required to obtain even a hearing on the merits renders relief illusive.161
The Supreme Court’s rare grant of relief in Davis possibly indicates that
lower courts should have granted Davis an evidentiary hearing on the
basis of the cumulative evidence before the case reached the Supreme
Court.
Going forward, courts could interpret the Davis decision as an
anomaly with little application outside the precise facts of the case. In
fact, the decision may discourage courts from granting relief by
showcasing the original writ of habeas corpus as a feasible option.
However, lower courts should not view the Supreme Court’s exceptional
move in such a limited way. Rather, the Supreme Court’s decision to
direct the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on Davis’s actual
innocence claim should encourage courts to apply a less strict
interpretation of the requirements for making a showing of actual
innocence on habeas review. Justice Stevens seemed to be advocating
this approach: If courts apply AEDPA in such a way that it bars
consideration of an actual innocence claim, then AEDPA is
unconstitutional.162
After the Thompson case, Judge Reinhardt reasoned that it was “time
to step back and look at what we are doing to ourselves and to our
system of justice.”163 While such an examination could not effect change
during the Rehnquist era of the 1990s, Judge Reinhardt saw it as “the
duty of the academy and the legal profession to make the record that will
be necessary when the pendulum swings.”164 Cases like those of Thomas
Thompson and Troy Davis, among numerous others, have made the
160. Fletcher, supra note 13, at 821.
161. See generally Pettys, supra note 29 (discussing the strict procedural rules that limit the
consideration of newly discovered evidence, even if that evidence could demonstrate actual
innocence).
162. See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text. See also Pettys, supra note 29, at 2362
(“The [miscarriage-of-justice] exception could have been crafted in a manner that would ensure
that, when there were reasonable suspicions that a person had been found guilty of a crime he or she
did not commit, the federal courts would evaluate the merits of the prisoner’s constitutional claims
and either grant or deny habeas relief accordingly.”).
163. Reinhardt, supra note 38, at 352.
164. Id.
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record. The Davis decision could—and should—set the pendulum
swinging back.
CONCLUSION
While Judge Fletcher asked the question “can justice be done?” in the
context of the death penalty, she did not answer it. Instead, she declared,
“We are a civilized nation. We are a caring people. We value human life.
We prize human dignity. The decision deliberately to take a human life
is an awesome responsibility.”165
“Justice” in the context of the death penalty is difficult to define.
Justice Brennan stated that, “law, when it merits the synonym justice, is
based on reason and insight.”166 Some will argue that justice is not done
so long as states are executing offenders. Others will argue that the long
time between conviction and execution means justice has not been done.
A third group, whether or not supporting the death penalty, will charge
that justice cannot be done unless condemned inmates receive full and
fair hearings on their claims. Such examination must not be influenced
by the grotesque nature of these crimes, by a desire for retribution, by
biased juries or judges, or by procedural restrictions preventing full and
fair analyses. It is this final definition of justice that the judicial system
must try to achieve. It is this definition of justice that is evident in the
death penalty opinions Judge Fletcher has authored over the years. And
it is this definition of justice that Davis could give courts the latitude to
achieve. While procedural hurdles erected in the name of “finality” have
taken priority in the past few decades, the Davis case should serve as a
turning point to allow judges to reach just results.

165. Fletcher, supra note 13, at 828.
166. William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from the
Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 313, 331 (1986).

